IS THE PUBLIC POLITICALLY COMPETENT?

- Downs (1957): Rational voters seek to utility maximize based on what they think candidates/parties will do for them. Voters are either competent or disinterested.
- Campbell et al. (1960): Actually, most people just vote on the basis of inherited party ID. They do not have ideologically consistent policy positions.
- Converse (1964): They key is whether people have ideological constraint and most people do not. People often have no political knowledge and form opinion about politics on the basis of irrelevant information.
- Zaller (1992): RAS model, says people have unstable preferences that are easily manipulated by the media and opinions that are made up off the top of their heads.
- Lupia (1994): actually, people can use a lot of heuristics and mental shortcuts to help them do a better job of making correct political choices than their limited information should let them. From here on out, people leave aside the big issue of whether the public is competent and shifts to a focus on biases.
- Jerit and Barabas (2012): people only learn facts that are consistent with their political views.
- Achen and Bartels (2016): elections turn on irrelevant and misleading considerations, the outcomes are essentially random. Voters are not rational, just use party, social idenity queues.

IS PRESIDENT POWERFUL?

- Neustadt (1960): presidents are not very powerful, their main power comes from their ability to persuade (through bargaining) congress and the bureaucracy to do stuff.
- Kernel (1997): another way that they can try to get congress to go along is to use public appeals, but these are dangerous.
- Skowronek (2000): President has lots of power but needs to bring the public along, and their success is also heavily determined by political cycles (who they came after).
- Howell (2005): no, actually presidents actually have a lot of power through their first mover advantage in executive actions. This gets stronger to the degree there is gridlock.
- Canes-Wrone et al. (2008): Presidents are also more powerful in foreign that domestic affairs.
- Kriner and Reeves (2015), Rogowski (2016): the president has more power than we though to move spending around in ways that benefit them and their party.

DO PEOPLE GET GOOD REPRESENTATION?

- Miller and Stokes (1963): dyadic representation is uneven and not great, there are information problems.
- Weisberg (1978): Actually, collective representation is better than dyadic always, so maybe we don’t have to worry.
- Stimson et al. (1995): While congruence may be bad, dynamic response is good. Looks at national policy “mood”.
- Erikson et al. (2002): changes in public opinion effect public policy

DO PARTIES MATTER IN CONGRESS?

- Mayhew (1974): parties don’t matter because people only want to get reelected - credit claim and position take.
- Rhode (1991): parties do matter for how legislators vote, but the right conditions have to be met
- Krehbiel (1993): actually, parties don’t matter because legislators would have voted that way anyway.
- Bawn et al. (2012) and Desmarais et al. (2014): Parties do matter for getting elected or reelected through EPN so they can exert more influence on what legislators do in congress.
- Jackman (2014): majoritarian rules matter and can make the parties ability to control the agenda weaker.

HOW DOES DIVIDED GOVERNMENT MATTER?

- Before Mayhew (1991): conventional wisdom was that divided government reduced legislative productivity.
- Mayhew (1991): There is no statistical difference in the number of major laws passed under divided and unified government.
- Krehbiel (1998): divided government doesn’t explain gridlock cause parties don’t matter, instead it is about preferences and pivotal voters.
- Binder (1999): within-branch conflict more than between-branch conflict is critical in shaping deadlock.
- Howell et al. (2000): Actually, divided government does have a big negative effect on landmark legislation, none on regular and positive on mundane. Problem with Mayhew (1991) was non-stationary time series.
- Cameron (2000): Also finds that divided government leads to fewer major bills.
- Binder (2015): reaffirms that divided government does contribute to gridlock, but so do other things.

HOW DOES POLITICS FACTOR INTO COURT DECISIONS?

- Before Dahl: scholars thought that the court pretty much makes mechanical legal decisions based on past precedent.
- Dahl (1957): The court is political and makes policy, is not independent, but has power through its constitutional legitimacy.
- Rosenberg (1991): The court has no power of its own, so it can only make policy if the other branches go along with it.
- Segal and Spaeth (2002): Judge are often almost entirely unconstrained by precedent. the attitudinal model best explains legal decisions, legal model incomplete, rational choice (try not to get overruled) is irrelevant.
- Clark (2009): the court does respond to congresses efforts to curb it.
WHO CONTROLS THE BUREAUCRACY?

- Before McCubbins and Schwartz (1984): scholars thought it was Congresses job to restrain the bureaucracy, but that they did not do a good job.
- McCubbins and Schwartz (1984): Congress prefers to exert passive rather than active control over the bureaucracy, and this works pretty well.
- McCubbins et al. (1987): administrative procedures requiring transparency are the mechanism that make fire alarms work.
- Epstein and O’Halloran (1996): divided government leads to more restrictive administrative procedures.
- Moe and Howell (1999), Howell (2005): The president can act unilaterally and thus can exert significant power over the bureaucracy.
- Howell and Lewis (2002): the president has more power over agencies created through executive order.
- Clinton et al. (2014): More committees overseeing an agency tends to be associated with less control.

HOW DO INTEREST GROUPS MATTER?

- Baumgartner and Leech (1991): before the 1950’s interest groups not important, in the 1950s scholars started to think that they were important and a decline in the 1970s.
- Truman (1971): says interest groups have been around for a long time and they mostly cancel each other out (potential interest groups) so they actually have a moderating effect on politics.
- Schattschneider (1975): Actually, interest groups tend to primarily represent the interests of the wealthy through controlling the political agenda.
- Hall and Wayman (1990): Interest groups use contributions to allied legislators to influence the agenda in congressional committees. They are not about vote buying.
- Hojnacki and Kimball (1998): previous work said lobbying was focussed on fence sitters, but they found that it actually goes to support allies.
- Hall and Deardorff (2006): lobbying is best thought of as a form of legislative subsidy. Groups will target strongest and most productive supporters.
- Schnakenberg (2016): the main purpose of lobbying allies is to get them to lobby others, not just introduce or support legislation.
- Bawn et al. (2012), Desmarais et al. (2014): The EPN controls the agenda via candidate selection. Interest groups are the party platforms.

WHAT ARE THE ROLES OF RACE AND GENDER IN POLITICS?

Gender matters for descriptive representation.

- Cowell-Meyers and Langbein (2009): more women in state legislatures leads to better substantive representation on women’s policy issues.
- Boyd et al. (2010): Women have both individual and panel effects on judging, but only when it comes to cases about sex discrimination.
- Anzia and Berry (2011): “Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect” – Women legislators will only run if they are above average, and thus out perform their male counterparts on average in securing funding for their districts (by 9%)".
- Reingold and Smith (2012): Race and gender of MCs both matter for substantive representation in state legislatures, and they have an interaction.

Race matters for both descriptive rep and straight discrim.

- Key (1949): Southern whites developed their political system in order to ensure that there would never be a party for black voters, to ensure they were kept down.
- Gay (2001): having a black MC does not increase black constituent participation, just supresses white participation.
- Butler and Broockman (2011): White legislators of both parties are less likely to help putatively black (than white) constituents register to vote, yet black representatives are far more likely.
- Tesler (2013): Since Obama’s election, there has been an increase in the association between ol fashioned racism and white republican voting.
- Enos (2016): racial threat occurs because of attitude change rather than selection, and causes whites to vote more and more conservatively. This is mediated by how close they live and to how many blacks.